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Abstract∗ 
 
The study of the of the IACHR case law, shows that the Court has developed a theory of the applicability of 
fundamental rights in private relations within the Latin American context, with the ultimate goal of approaching 
the most important social problems of Latin American contemporary history. This theory has contributed to the 
democratical transition of many countries of the region. 
 
The IACHR case law has phases. The first one includes judgments whose main issue were the Member 
States duties to respect and protect the fundamental rights listed in the Convention. In this judgments the 
IACHR adopts a doctrine that resembles the American “state action”. 
  
In the second phase, the IACHR judgments held that the Convention duties were to be considered erga 
omnes obligations reaching not only state citizen relations, but also inter privates relation.  
 
Lastly, the third phase is well represented by its most relevant case the, Advisory Opinion 18/03 solicited 
by the United Mexican States regarding the legal status of immigrants. The opinion is meant to be crucial 
for the final recognition of the Drittwirkung of fundamental rights in Latin America.  
 
 
A partir del estudio de la jurisprudencia regional de los últimos veinte años es posible identificar que la 
Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) ha construido toda una teoría sobre la vigencia de los 
derechos fundamentales en las relaciones entre particulares en el ámbito latinoamericano, a partir de la cual 
ha abordado los problemas sociales más importantes de la historia latinoamericana contemporánea, 
contribuyendo así a la transición democrática de muchos países de la región. Este estudio analizará las 
etapas por las que ha transitado la jurisprudencia de la CIDH, y que han llevado a los criterios que 
actualmente maneja dicho organismo. 
 
La primera etapa se conforma por una serie de sentencias cuyo común denominador es el análisis de la 
obligación de respeto y vigilancia de los derechos fundamentales por parte de los Estados prevista en el 
artículo 1.1 de la Convención Americana. Este principio llevará a la Corte Interamericana a planteamientos 
muy cercanos a los propuestos por la doctrina estadounidense de la state action, al hacer uso de un buen 
número de sentencias dictadas por la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos entre 1960 y 1980.  
 
En la segunda fase, la relevancia en la determinación de las características del agente que ha cometido la 
violación de los derechos fundamentales será sustituida por una serie de planteamientos en los que el 
carácter de la norma violada se convierte en el centro de atención. En esta etapa, la Corte Interamericana 
consagra la idea de que los derechos fundamentales previstos en la Convención resultan obligaciones erga 
omnes, que se imponen no sólo en relación con el poder del Estado sino también respecto a actuaciones de 
terceros particulares.  
 
Por último, la tercera fase en la evolución de la jurisprudencia está representada por el caso más relevante 
en esta materia: la Opinión Consultiva 18/03 solicitada por los Estados Unidos Mexicanos sobre la 
                                                          
* Professor of Constitutional Law at the Department of Public State Law at the Universidad Carlos III of Madrid. 
B.A. Escuela Libre de Derecho (México) and Universidad del País Vasco (Spain). JD. Universidad Carlos III de 
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condición jurídica de los inmigrantes. Esta resolución, que marca una tendencia hasta nuestros días, 
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1. Introduction 
 
In 1970, HÉCTOR FIX ZAMUDIO published a ground-breaking article in the Revista Jurídica 
Veracruzana, entitled “Aspects of the Protection of Human Rights in Relations Between Private 
Individuals in Mexico and Latin America.”1. FIX ZAMUDIO, as in many other issues, was one of 
the first Latin American jurists to suggest the possible enforcement of fundamental rights 
between individuals.  
 
That pioneering work appeared in a period in which the matter in question was at the forefront 
of the discussion in comparative doctrine and case law. While in the United States the Supreme 
Court’s doctrine of state action reached its greatest expansive force, on the other side of the 
Atlantic, the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany consolidated the doctrine initiated in the 
Lüth case of 1958, and the German tenet of the Drittwirkung der Grundrechte became a reference 
for the rest of Continental Europe.2 At the same time, various Latin American ordinances – as 
was the case in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay or 
Uruguay – regulated the diverse aspects of the amparo suit and other similar instruments, for the 
purpose of extending their protective field to certain violations of fundamental rights between 
individuals.3  
 
The discussion about the effect of fundamental rights in private relations has had different fates 
on the two continents. In the case of Europe, the majority of the Constitutional Courts have 
developed a solid doctrine in this matter. In Latin America, aside from the extremely rich 
doctrine elaborated by the Colombian Constitutional Court4, the case law of constitutional courts 
regarding the Drittwirkung is currently either in a very elemental or practically non-existent 
phase of development, as is the case with Mexico.  
 
One of the various reasons for the jurisprudential poverty in this matter, at least in the case of 
Mexico and surely in other countries in the region, is the ignorance and even rejection of a 
common legal reference that should otherwise be enforced by the national courts in their daily 
tasks. I refer to the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The objective of the 
present work is to analyze the theories and concepts developed on this jurisprudential body, 
which, as rich as it is little studied, constitutes an invaluable source for any study that aims to 
                                                          
1 This work first appeared in French in the Volume III of Liber Amicorum Discipulorumque René Bassin, a book in 
honor of René Cassin. 
 
2 Throughout this work, I will use the German term Drittwirkung, in virtue of the fact that it is the term applied to 
the problem that we are concerned with in the German system, in which the extensive literature on this topic 
originated. Legal doctrine in the Spanish and English languages has endorsed this term. 
 
3 See H. FIX-ZAMUDIO, 1999, pp. 163-165. 
 
4 For a first approximation to the case of Colombia, see E. CIFUENTES MUÑOS, 1998; and A. JULIO ESTRADA, 2000. 
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address in a complete manner the applicability of fundamental rights in private relations in the 
Latin American legal ordinances.5 
 
If an unwitting reader were to look at the works that examine the jurisprudential criteria of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights –hereafter IACHR– he would conclude that the 
Drittwirkung is a matter of little significance in the Inter-American case law and has been 
addressed neither exhaustively nor systematically. Nevertheless, the reality is quite different, 
since, if one examines the regional case law of the last twenty years, it would not be unreasonable 
to affirm that the IACHR has constructed an entire theory about the applicability of fundamental 
rights in relations between individuals in the Latin American sphere. We will structure our 
analysis in three stages, successive in time and clearly identifiable in the relevant case law. 
 
The first phase is constituted by a series of judgments whose common denominator is the 
analysis of the obligation of respect for and protection of fundamental rights on the part of the 
states listed in Article 1.1 of the Convention. This principle, whose study is a constant in the 
entirety of the IACHR’s case law, brings the Inter-American Court very close to the principles of 
the American doctrine of state action.  
 
In the second phase, the relevance of determining the characteristics of the agent who committed 
the violation of fundamental rights is substituted by a series of formulations in which the 
character of the violated norm becomes the focus of attention. It is in this moment that the Inter-
American Court establishes the idea that the fundamental rights listed in the Convention are erga 
omnes obligations that are imposed not only in relation to the state but also to the actions of third 
party individuals. 
 
Lastly, the third phase in the evolution of the case law is represented by the most relevant case in 
this matter: Advisory Opinion 18/03 solicited by the United Mexican States regarding the legal 
status of immigrants. This resolution definitively establishes the direct effectiveness of 
fundamental rights in relations between private individuals. 
 
 
2. The Obligation of Respect for and Protection of Fundamental Rights: the 
Assumption of State Action 
 
Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras (1987) was not only the first case in which the IACHR considered 
the question of the effect of fundamental rights in private relations. As the very first contentious 
case submitted to the Inter-American Court’s jurisdiction, it was also the case that established the 
foundations of the entire Inter-American system of human rights. This case, like those of Godinez 
                                                          
5 In view of the limits and objectives of this work, I will not address two previous problems that must be resolved 
with respect to the application of the Inter-American system of human rights and internal ordinances. In the first 
place, the expansion of the catalogue of human rights in national ordinances through the Inter-American 
Convention on Human Rights and, in second place, the reception of the Inter-American case law by the internal 
judicial organs. With respect to the analysis of these questions in the case of Mexico, see J. MIJANGOS Y GONZÁLEZ, 
2007. 
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Cruz v. Honduras (1987), Paniagua Morales v. Guatemala (1988), Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala 
(2000) and Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras (2003), occurred within the context of the Dirty 
Wars that engulfed Central America during the 1980s. In all of them, a number of individuals 
considered to be subversive by the regime were the victims of kidnappings and extrajudicial 
executions.  
 
In the study of this first phase we will focus on the case Velásquez Rodríguez. Manfredo Velásquez, 
a university student related to subversive groups, was violently arrested without a warrant by 
elements of the Honduran secret police and by civilians acting under their orders. As in 
hundreds of other cases in Honduras between 1981 and 1984, Velásquez was assassinated after 
suffering various forms of torture, and buried in a clandestine cemetery. 
 
The Inter-American Commission referred the case to the jurisdiction of the Court so that it could 
determine whether the Honduran state violated Articles 4 (the right to life), 5 (the right to 
personal integrity), and 7 (the right to personal freedom) of the American Convention on Human 
Rights – hereafter ACHR. For the Court, the analysis of this case, and any other referred to its 
jurisdiction, comes determined by the scope attributed Article 1.1 of the Convention.6 In the 
court’s consideration, this article “charges the States Parties with the fundamental duty to respect 
and guarantee the rights recognized in the Convention [so that] any impairment of those rights 
which can be attributed under the rules of international law to the action or omission of any public 
authority constitutes an act imputable to the State.”7 
 
In the terms of Article 1.1, the Member States, upon signing the American Convention, assume a 
double obligation. The first is the respect for the rights and freedoms recognized in the ACHR, while 
the second calls for guaranteeing the free and full exercise of fundamental rights to every person 
under its jurisdiction -- an obligation that does not end with a normative ordinance, but rather 
carries with it the need of a governmental conduct that ensures the existence of an effective 
guarantee of free and full exercise of human rights.8 
 
In this line of thought, it is clear that, in principle, the state is responsible for any violation of the 
rights recognized in the Convention committed by a state authority or by persons who act on 
powers they possess because of their status as officials. Yet for the Inter-American Court, that is 
certainly not the only situation in which the State can be held responsible for the violation of 
human rights. In effect, “an illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not 
directly imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a private person or because the 
person responsible has not been identified) can lead to international responsibility of the State, 
                                                          
6 Article 1.1 of the ACHR, in the part that interests us, establishes that “the States Parties to this Convention 
undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their 
jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms (…)”. This general duty of respect runs parallel 
in other treaties on human rights, for example, Article 2.1 of the Pact of Civil and Political Rights, or Articles 2.1 
and 38.1 of the Convention on the Rights of Children. 
 
7 Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment of July 29, 1988. 
 
8 Godinez Cruz v Honduras, Judgement of January 20, 1989, par. 175; and Cantos v. Argentina, Judgement of 
November 28, 2002 par. 49. 
 6
InDret 1/2008  Javier Mijangos y González 
not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to 
respond to it as required by the Convention.”9 
 
In this first stage of the Court’s case law, fundamental rights are seen by the Court as limits 
placed on the actions of authorities; the responsibility of the state, nevertheless, extends to those 
cases in which it is demonstrated that “state authorities supported or tolerated infringement of 
the rights recognized in the Convention.”10 For the Court, it is irrelevant that the individuals who 
participated in the kidnapping, torture and assassination of Manfredo Velásquez did not 
formally belong to the security corps of the Honduran state; what is decisive for the purpose of 
determining the violation of fundamental rights is that, in all of these cases, there exists a 
significant implication of the Honduran authorities. If such an implication is confirmed – which, in 
the terms of the Court can be translated as a lack of due diligence, support, acquiescence or tolerance – 
the action of the individuals is seen as equivalent to an act of a state authority, according to 
Article 1.1 of the Convention. 
 
This type of construction is not novel in comparative case law. In fact, the IACHR adopts a good 
part of the arguments used in the American doctrine of state action. In the United States of 
America, as in Mexico, and unlike Continental Europe, the unidirectionality of fundamental 
rights is maintained as one of the most firm pillars of U.S. constitutional theory. Thus the 
Amendments to the Federal Constitution of 1787, which form the Bill of Rights in the American 
legal system, can only be invoked in the case of state action. 
 
It is necessary to keep in mind that the one of the motives for establishing the Bill of Rights was 
the need to defend the historic liberties of individuals against possible violations committed by 
one entity in particular: the emerging power of the federation and, specifically, its legislative 
power. M. Fioravanti points out that “only in the U.S. experience do the historicist, individualist 
and contractualist models recover their original and common “guarantist” inspiration, against 
the statist and legal-centric philosophies of Continental Europe.”11 This means that ever since the 
origins of the American constitutional tradition, rights are conceived of as something to be 
preserved from the malign, but inevitable, rise of state powers. 
 
Thus, in the framework of such considerations, it is possible to contextualize the principle by 
which the possible violations of fundamental rights by private individuals, both in terms of 
validity and effect, are governed by the rest of the infraconstitutional ordinances – a principle 
which has been symbiotically accepted in a large part of the rest of the continent, as it was in the 
case of Mexico. 
 
                                                          
9 Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgement of July 29, 1988, par. 172 (emphasis ours). 
 
10 Paniagua Morales v. Guatemala, Judgment of March 8, 1998, par. 91. This case is also known as Panel Blanca 
(“white van”), due to the fact that in 1987 and 1988, members of the Guardia de Hacienda of Guatemala, heavily 
armed, forcefully detained people and forced them to into a white van. Eleven people were tortured and killed 
and their bodies abandoned only a few days after their detention in the city streets of Guatemala and its outskirts. 
 
11 M. FIORAVANTI, 1998, p. 93. Similarly, see G. ZAGREBELSKY, 1997, p. 54. 
 7
InDret 1/2008  Javier Mijangos y González 
Against this background it would appear that the question has been closed from the beginning 
and that the court’s duty would simply involve applying an examination of state formality to all 
those acts constituting a violation of human rights, in order to determine the normative 
subsystem to which they must be redirected for their adequate resolution. However, since this 
was evidently too narrow a path to follow, it was precisely the Supreme Court of the United 
States the one that developed and experimented with a number of alternative criteria for defining 
the area that lies within state action’s penumbra. 
 
A complete examination of the doctrine of state action is beyond the scope of this work.12 
Nevertheless, we will mention some of its most distinct characteristics, since this type of response 
to the Drittwirkung – which evades the substantive problem and which focuses on the expansion 
of the concept of state authority – is the one adopted by the Inter-American Court in the first 
phase. 
 
The argumentation of the case Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co. (1970) was the direct source from which 
the IACHR draw its opinion in Velásquez Rodríguez. This case said that what is decisive in 
assessing the existence of a violation of fundamental rights is whether in fact the actions of the 
individuals relied upon the support or tolerance of state authority. The case Adickes v. Kress13, like 
Traux v. Corrigan14, United States v. Price15, or Joshua DeShanney v. Winnebago County Department of 
Social Service16, are cases in which there exists no doubt that the act in violation of fundamental 
rights was carried out by a private individual. Nevertheless, the controversy comes about when 
determining the state’s degree of participation or implication in the act of the private individual, 
with the purpose of transforming it into state action, and thus making it an issue of constitutional 
justice. 
 
The case that serves as a guide to illustrate this aspect of the doctrine of state action dates back to 
August 1964, in which Sandra Adickes, a white schoolteacher in a black neighbourhood in 
Mississippi decided to have lunch with six of her black students at a restaurant owned by a Mr. 
Kress. The owner of the locale refused to serve Adickes because she was in the company of black 
people. Once the group decided to leave the restaurant, Sandra Adickes was detained by the 
police due to the commotion she had provoked when refused service. 
 
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court, written by Judge J. M. Harlan, establishes, in the first 
place, that the 14th Amendment does not prohibit individuals from discriminating based on race, 
                                                          
12 The most complete study of this matter, in the Spanish language, has been done by J. M. BILBAO UBILLOS, 1997. 
In English, the essential works are the following: R. J. GLENNON and J. E. NOWAK, 1974, pp. 656-705; I. NERKEN, 
1977, pp. 297-366; E. CHEMERINSKY, 1985, pp. 503-557; A. R. MADRY, 1992, pp. 781-884; R. J. KROTOSZYNSKI, 1995, pp. 
302-347; W. BROOKS, 2001, pp. 1-75; and M. TUSHNET, 2003, pp. 79-98. 
 
13 398 U.S. 144 (1970). 
 
14 257 U.S. 312 (1921). 
 
15 383 U.S. 787 (1966). 
 
16 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
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as it is an expression of personal predilections that cannot be limited by the state. Yet the 
conclusion would be different if the discrimination were to have been the result of a custom or 
ordinance imposed or applied by the authorities in the restaurants of the State of Mississippi. For 
the Supreme Court, the fact that segregation is a social custom is not sufficient to establish that 
there has been a violation of rights, as Adickes alleged. Instead, the plaintiff must demonstrate 
that the accused acted “under the appearance of the legality of a custom or usage of the state” 
and with the “implication” of a government employee.17 
 
It is logical for the Supreme Court to insist on the participation, to some degree, of some 
authority, since if the simple inactivity on the part of the state were a determining factor to prove 
the existence of state action, practically any violation of fundamental rights committed by private 
individuals could be attributed to the state. Specifically, it was not proven that the racial 
segregation in this case was a practice established by the local authorities, but rather a simple and 
regrettable custom of the restaurant's owner, for which reason it was concluded that state action 
did not exist in this case.  
 
The Supreme Court’s rejection of state responsibility is a constant in cases with these 
characteristics since it believes that such responsibility due to the lack protection only exists in 
those cases in which people are deprived of freedom while in custody of the state.18 The 
conclusion of the Inter-American Court, however, would be slightly different. Through these 
formulations, the IACHR considers the obligation of protection of Member States to be of a 
general nature. It applies to all situations and all people who are within the state’s jurisdiction. 
Once the state’s tolerance for the action or its inactivity has been proven, the fact is deemed 
imputable to the state, for violation of a duty required by Article 1.1 of the Convention.19 
 
In its effort to extend the scope of the state’s responsibility, the Inter-American Court addresses 
another of the most significant aspects of the doctrine of state action: the state’s approval of actions 
by private individuals that violate fundamental rights.  
 
                                                          
17 Cfr. Monroe v. Pape [365 U.S. 167 (1961)]. 
 
18 This is how the Supreme Court ruled in the DeShanney v. Winnebago case of 1988, the last of the resolutions in 
which the highest U.S. court addressed this aspect of state action. The plaintiff in this case was a minor who had 
been a victim of abuse by his father, whom he lived with. The defendants, the Department of Social Services in a 
county in Wisconsin, received complaints that the minor was suffering abuse at the hands of his father, and in 
spite of various measures they adopted to protect the minor, their intervention did not include an order to 
remove the child from the father’s custody. The father hit him so violently that he suffered brain damage and 
severe mental retardation. The mother of the child alleged the existence of state action, as in her opinion, the 
knowledge on the part of the authorities of the county of Winnebago of the danger that the minor was in created 
a “special relation” from which there originated an obligation to protect the child. For the Supreme Court, the 
state’s obligation of protection came not from the authorities’ knowledge of the difficulties of an individual or the 
testimony that he gives about his intention to help him, but rather, exclusively, from the limitations that the state 
itself imposes on the freedom of the individual, be it through imprisonment or internment in any institution 
under its control. Regarding this matter, see Estelle v. Gamble 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Youngberg v. Romero 457 U.S. 102 
(1982); as well as the work of D. A. STRAUSS, 1989, p. 67. 
 
19 Cfr. Gangaram Panday v. Surinam, Judgement of January 21, 1995, par. 62. 
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For the IACHR, “if the State apparatus acts in such a way that the violation goes unpunished and 
the victim's full enjoyment of such rights is not restored as soon as possible, the State has failed to 
comply with its duty to ensure the free and full exercise of those rights… This is true regardless 
of what agent is eventually found responsible for the violation. Where the acts of private parties 
that violate the Convention are not seriously investigated, those parties are aided in a sense by 
the government, thereby making the State responsible.”20 In this respect, the duty to investigate 
and remedy violations is not only understood to refer to the police authorities of the state – it also 
extends to the judicial bodies, since if their rulings do not remedy the relevant violations, they 
would be failing to comply with Article 1.1 of the Convention and their actions would subject to a 
hearing of the Inter-American Court.21 
 
It is not difficult to relate this argument to the theory of “mediated effectiveness” proposed by the 
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany.22 In this line, the national courts, in virtue of Article 1.1 
of the Convention, would be compelled to apply the contents of the American Convention when 
determining the applicable right; otherwise, the IACHR would be authorized to examine the 
internal processes of the respective country. 
 
Regardless of the theoretical implications of the mediated effect thesis, which we will not address 
in this work, the main problem that this doctrinal position originates is that, once again, 
practically any act by private individuals implies state responsibility. In the American case law, 
this was precisely the criticism that was aimed at the first resolution that maintained that judicial 
intervention approving the act of a private individual implied state responsibility: the case of 
Shelley v. Kraemer of 1948. The heart of this case was the possible existence of state action in the 
judicial enforcement of private agreements that impede ownership or possession of real estate on 
the basis of racial motives.23  
                                                          
20 Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment of July 29, 1988, par. 176 and 177. A similar argument can be seen in 
Baldeón García v. Peru, Judgement of April 6, 2006, par. 91. 
 
21 Cfr. Villagrán Morales y otros –caso niños de la calle—v. Guatemala, Judgement of November 19, 1999, par. 222; and 
Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, Judgement of November 25, 2000, par. 188. 
 
22 In conformity with this thesis, the concretization of fundamental rights in relations between private individuals 
happens at the moment in which the respective judicial organ applies the fundamental rights as interpretive 
parameters when it resolves disagreements presented to it. See J. MIJANGOS Y GONZÁLEZ, La vigencia de los derechos 
fundamentales en las relaciones entre particulares, Porrúa, Mexico, 2004, pp. 18-27. 
 
23 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Shelley is one of the four cases known collectively as the Restrictive Covenant Cases. The three 
other cases are: McGhee v. Sipes, Hurd v. Hodge, and Urciolo v. Hodge. The Shelley v. Kraemer case originates from the 
following facts: on February 16, 1911, thirty of a total of thirty nine new owners of real estate in the city of St. 
Louis, Missouri, signed and registered an agreement. This established that the property was“restricted to the use 
and occupancy for the term of Fifty (50) years from this date, so that it shall be a condition all the time and 
whether recited and referred to as (sic) not in subsequent conveyances and shall attach to the land, as a condition 
precedent to the sale of the same, that hereafter no part of said property or any portion thereof shall be, for said 
term of Fifty-years, occupied by any person not of the Caucasian race, it being intended hereby to restrict the use 
of said property for said period of time against the occupancy as owners or tenants of any portion of said 
property for resident or other purpose by people of the Negro or Mongolian Race” In August 1945, as a result of 
the sales contract, the signers, who were black, --through a considerable sum—received, from one of the owners, 
a writ in which they were guaranteed the deed for part of the property in question. The Court that heard the case 
found that the signers did not know of the restrictive agreement at the time of purchase. In October 1945, owners 
of other parts of the real estate bound to the terms of the contract, sued in the Circuit Court of St. Louis to have 
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The Supreme Court of the United States begins its argumentation reminding that, since the 
decision of the Civil Rights Cases of 1883, it was firmly established that the behaviour prohibited 
by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment was only that which could be reasonably 
classified as an action of state authority. Such constitutional amendment did not raise any barrier 
against purely private conduct, as wrong or discriminatory as it may be. 
 
In this line, the Supreme Court holds that discriminatory agreements in themselves cannot be 
considered a violation of any right so long as the terms of these agreements are agreed upon and 
adhered to voluntarily. The conclusion would be different, however, if these agreements were 
insured exclusively through the imposition of their terms by state courts.  
 
It is clear that, were it not for the active intervention of the state courts, the plaintiffs would have 
been free to occupy the property without any restriction. For the Supreme Court, the Shelley case 
is not one of those cases – as it has been suggested – in which state authorities simply abstained 
from acting, leaving the private individuals free to impose the discrimination they wish. Instead, 
it was a case in which the courts placed at the individual’s disposal all of the coercive power of 
the state in order to deny the plaintiffs, on the basis of race or colour, the enjoyment of the right 
to property in an area in which the plaintiffs wanted and could acquire property and in which 
the sellers were willing to sell. For the plaintiffs in these cases, the difference between imposing 
the restrictive agreements or not is the difference between being denied the right to obtain 
property from other members of the community and granting them full enjoyment of these rights 
based on equality. As a consequence, judicial authorities were the ones who violated equal 
protection, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
This ruling, which caused a great commotion and torrent of commentary, set the basis for a true 
revolution in the doctrine of state action. The resolution of the Supreme Court implied, in 
practice, the acceptance of the substantive protection of fundamental rights in private relations. 
Although the sentence emphasized the execution of the discriminatory pact on the part of the 
judicial organ, what Shelley v. Kraemer really said was that the validity of private pacts depends 
on their due compliance with the Bill of Rights, as they would otherwise not be validated by the 
courts.24 As a consequence, due to the danger presented by the unidirectionality that this 
doctrine entailed, the American constitutional case law decided to distance itself from this 
precedent in resolutions such as Black v. Cutter Laboratories25 and Evans v. Abney26. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
 
the blacks stopped from taking possession of the property, and that they be deprived of the property deed and 
that this be returned to the seller, or whoever the court decided. The court denied the petition, on the basis that 
the contract never came to be definitive or complete, as it was the intention of the parties that it would not come 
into force until it was signed by all of the owners, and all of their signatures were never obtained. The Superior 
Court of Missouri revoked this last resolution. 
 
24 Cfr. H. WECHSLER, 1959, p. 29; and D. KENNEDY, 1982, p. 1352. 
 
25 351 U.S. 292 (1956). 
 
26 396 U.S. 435, 445 (1970). 
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The Inter-American Court, in a stage in which there still existed doubts about the 
multidirectionality of fundamental rights, was aware of these risks. Combined with has been 
previously mentioned, its major worry and that which will ultimately lead to the abandonment of 
the thesis of judicial mediation, was that a doctrine of this type would convert the IACHR into a 
type of appeals court of the sentences of internal judicial bodies. This would provoke serious 
friction between the Member States, and would distance it from its nature and its own goals, 
which the IACHR has been aware of since its first rulings.27 
 
For this reason, state responsibility for judicial validation and, in general, the search for state 
involvement, is abandoned by the Inter-American Court as an element that determines the 
applicability of fundamental rights in private relations.28 A substantial number of cases that the 
court heard at the beginning of this decade and in those in which a private individual violates 
fundamental rights, will obligate the court to explore new paths in this matter. 
 
3. The First Approximation to the Drittwirkung: Fundamental Rights as Erga Omnes 
Obligations 
 
The Inter-American court inaugurated, after the case Blake v. Guatemala, a new era in its case law 
in which the study of the nature of the violated norm became the central argument for the 
purposes of affirming the Drittwirkung of the rights listed in the Convention. 
 
In March 1985, two U.S. citizens were assassinated in Guatemala at the hands of the Civilian 
Defense Patrols.29 The Inter-American Commission referred the case to the IACHR so that it could 
assess Guatemala’s responsibility under the argument that the “civilian patrols” acted as agents 
of the state. The Guatemalan government, hardened by the various penalties that it had received 
in the case of the disappearances of political activists by members of its secret police, came up 
with a strategy to evade its responsibility. According to the Guatemalan government, the IACHR 
lacked the authority to assess the responsibility for the disappearance of the American citizens 
because the facts on which the demand was based constituted an “a common criminal act, under 
                                                          
27 See also Suárez Roser v. Ecuador, Judgement of November 12, 1997, par. 37; Garrido y Baigorria v. Argentina, 
Judgement of April 27, 1998, par. 24; and Cesti Hurtado v. Peru, Judgement of January 26, 1999, par. 47. 
 
28 In the last few years we have only been able to identify three relevant cases in which the IACHR has 
determined the responsibility of the state for having given cover, passively, to the acts of the individuals. See also, 
Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras (Judgement of June 7, 2003); 19 Comerciantes v. Colombia (Judgement of July 5, 
2004); and Masacres de Ituango v. Colombia (Judgement of July 1, 2006). 
 
29 Nicholas Chapman Blake, journalist, and Griffith Davis, photographer, residents of Guatemala, headed for a 
small village of the country on March 26, 1985. The purpose of the trip was to obtain information to write an 
article about one of the sectors of the Guatemalan guerrillas. That day they were intercepted by the Civilian Self-
Defense Patrol of El Llano, a paramilitary organization formed by peasants and indigenous members that carried 
out patrol work, defence and control of guerrilla movement. Years later it was determined that members of this 
patrol moved the Americans to an unpopulated place to assassinate them and incinerate their bodies to avoid 
their discovery. 
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which are classified homicide and murder, and not a case of the violation of human rights, as are 
the right to freedom and life.”30 
 
The IACHR ruled in this case that the civilian patrols acted as agents of the state, since they 
received resources, arms, training and, at times, direct orders from the Guatemalan military. The 
acquiescence of the state in relation to the activities of these paramilitary groups allowed the 
extension of responsibility to Guatemalan authorities. Nevertheless, questions hover over the 
argumentation of the Court. The Court itself was aware that on occasions it is impossible to 
demonstrate a general state of impunity with respect to this type of actions, to prove that the 
violations are attributable to a policy of the state or, simply, to show a connection, as small as it 
may be, to state authority. The Court dealt with these issues in a series of resolutions in which 
Colombia was accused of various violations of fundamental rights perpetrated by guerrillas and 
paramilitary groups, in spite of an active and dedicated policy against these groups. 
 
The protagonist in this search for alternative jurisprudential solutions was the Brazilian A. A. 
Cançado Trindade. This judge of the IACHR, elected in 1994, issued a vote based on the Blake v. 
Guatemala case that would become the basis for achieving the applicability of fundamental rights 
in private relations. 
 
Cançado argued that it was necessary to demystify certain frequent and improper postulates 
such as the existence of eternal and unchanging truths, as these were in reality products of their 
time, that is, legal solutions formulated in a certain stage in the evolution of law, in agreement 
with the prevailing ideas of the age. One of these ideas was the one that sees international treaties 
as norms that limit only the actions of states. The treaties on human rights, rather, establish 
objective obligations and represent standards of behaviour aimed at the creation of an 
international public order.31 In his opinion, the absolute nature of the autonomy of will cannot be 
invoked against the existence jus cogens norms such as the fundamental rights listed in the 
ACHR. These are erga omnes obligations of protection and, as a result, are the minimum 
expression of all legal relations of the national ordinances, including those that occur between 
non-state actors.32 
 
Cançado’s arguments would be adopted by all of the judges of the IACHR in the case of 
Comunidad de Paz de San José v. Colombia of 2002. In this case, which is very revealing of the 
tragedy the Colombian society is still subjected to, it was unquestionable that the perpetrators of 
                                                          
30 Cfr. Blake v. Guatemala, Judgement of July 2, 1996, par. 25. The Guatemalan state argued that the Civilian Patrol 
were voluntary community organizations that originated in areas of conflict and that they were formed by the 
inhabitants of these areas for the purpose of defending their lives and property from subversion. It pointed out 
that it was normal for these patrols to be tightly linked to the military, but that this does not mean that their 
members were part of or had equal functions as that of the Armed Forces, since the members of the patrols did 
not receive any type of funding from the military nor were they subject to military discipline. 
 
31 Blake v. Guatemala, opinion by judge Cançado in the Judgement of January 24, 1998, par. 20-29, and opinion by 
Judge Cançado in the Judgement of January 22, 1999, par. 24 and 27; Las Palmeras v. Colobmia, opinion by judge 
Cançado in the Judgement of February 4, 2000 par. 7. 
 
32 Personas haitanas y dominicanas de origen haitano en la República Dominicana, opinion by judge Cançado at the 
request for provisional measures of August 7, 2000, par. 25. 
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more than fifty murders in a period of nine months were members of a paramilitary group called 
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia. In the opinion of the Court, for the general obligation of respect 
for fundamental rights listed in Article 1.1 of the Convention to be effective, “it is imposed not 
only in relation to the power of the state, but also in the relations between private individuals 
(clandestine groups, paramilitary groups or other groups made up of private individuals).”33  
 
In this resolution it was established that the legal development of the erga omnes members 
obligations of protection had to assume a greater and greater importance, more than anything 
because of the diversification of the sources of human rights violations – as evident in a situation 
of internal armed conflict as in the case of Comunidad de Paz. This new situation requires, by the 
judgement of the Court, "the recognition of the effects of the American Convention vis-à-vis third 
parties (the Drittwirkung)”.34  
 
From the year 2003 on, this recognition comes about in all those cases in which the Court 
approaches a violation of fundamental rights produced in a relation between private individuals. 
Thus, in the cases of Comunidades del Jiguamiandó y del Curbaradó v. Colombia, of Pueblo indígena de 
Kankuamo v. Colombia, or in that of Pueblo indígena de Sarayaku v. Ecuador, the Court insists that the 
Member States are to be pressured to heed “the wide reach of the erga omnes obligation of 
protection (...), characterized by the jus cogens, from which they emanate, as norms of objective 
character that cover all the receivers of the legal norms, as well as the members of the organs of 
the state as well as private individuals."35 
 
The relation between the norms of jus cogens and erga omnes obligations, central aspects in the 
argumentation of the Court, will not be duly addressed until Advisory Opinion 18/03, a 
resolution that begins the third stage in the case law of the Court in this matter, covered in the 
next section. For now, what matters to us is to show that in this phase, multidirectionality is, by 
the Court’s judgement, a characteristic that can be predicated on the entire catalogue of 
fundamental rights of the American Convention. 
 
Lastly, it should not be thought that in all these cases, the Inter-American Court, in its rulings, 
forces the States to adopt the necessary measures for the protection and guarantee of the 
fundamental rights that have been violated. The instrumental imputation of the violation to the 
                                                          
33 Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartadó v. Colombia, Judgement of June 18, 2002, par. 11, and Judgement of 
November 17, 2004, par 13. Comunidad de Paz was not only relevant for the object of study of this work. It also 
represents a milestone for Inter-American case law, as for the first time it is recognized that the provisional 
measures that the Court can establish reach a variety of people who, although not identified beforehand, may be 
victims. Regarding the Colombian problem, see also the interesting work of A. SEAGRAVE, 2001, pp. 525-546. 
 
34 Comunidad de Paz (…) v. Colombia, concurrent vote of judge Cançado in the Judgement of June 18, 2002, par. 14. 
 
35 Comunidades del Jiguamiandó y del Curbaradó v. Colombia, Judgment of March 6, 2003, part 11, and Judgment 
March 15, 2005, part 8; Pueblo indígena de Kankuamo v. Colombia, Judgment of July 5, 2004, part 11; and Pueblo 
indígena de Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Judgment of July 6, 2004, part 10. In this last case it is important to highlight that 
the individual who committed the violation was not a guerrilla or paramilitary group, bur rather a single 
company: Compañía General de Combustible de Argentina. The security personnel of this company, which 
carries out petroleum digs on the land of the indigenous Kichwa community, was charged with the violation of 
the right of movement to the detriment of this indigenous community. 
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national public organs only fulfils a procedural function, with the objective of correctly 
articulating the legal procedure provided for in Articles 61 and 62 of the ACHR. However, the 
trial that the Inter-American Court carries out in the second phase of the case law deals with, 
invariably, whether the private individuals’ actions conform to the fundamental rights listed in 
the American Convention. Once it has determined the existence of a violation of this type, it 
reiterates the multidirectionality of the rights directly required by Article 1.1 of the ACHR, and 
pressures the states to restore the violated right through necessary means specific to each case.36  
 
The direct accusation of private individuals with the violation of fundamental rights is a constant 
since 2003. This situation was definitively agreed upon in Advisory Opinion 18/03, the true 
leading case of the Inter-American doctrine of the Drittwirkung. 
 
 
4. The Direct Effect of Fundamental Rights in the American Convention: Advisory 
Opinion 18/03 
 
On May 10, 2002, Mexico, based on Article 64.1 of the ACHR, submitted a request for advisory 
opinion to the Inter-American Court. According to the Convention itself, the IACHR has two 
essential powers. The first, within which all of the cases that we have studied to this moment fall, 
is of a jurisdictional or litigious nature. Through this authority, the Court is entitled to hear any 
case relating to the interpretation and application of the clauses of the Convention submitted to it 
whenever the Member States recognize such authority. The second authority is of an advisory 
nature. The Member States of the Organization of American States can consult the Court about 
the interpretation of the Convention or about other treaties concerning the protection of human 
rights in the American states, as well as the compatibility of any of its internal laws and the 
mentioned international instruments.37 
 
In the exercise of its advisory function, the Court is not called upon to resolve questions of fact, 
but rather unravel the meaning, purpose and reason of the international norms regarding human 
rights. In this sense, and unlike the rulings given in its litigious function, there exists no 
controversy with respect to the legal consequences linked to the “opinions” of the Court. 
According to the doctrine, and the Inter-American Court itself, the binding nature of the 
Advisory Opinions with respect to the member states, whether they solicited this opinion or not, 
                                                          
36 Similarly, Caballero Delgado y Santana v. Colombia, Judgement of December 8, 1995, par. 69; Suárez Rosero v. 
Ecuador, Judgement of November 12, 1997, par. 107; and Castillo Petruzzi y otros v. Peru, Judgement of May 30, 
1999, par. 220. 
 
37 The Court itself has pointed out that, through its jurisdiction, it can address an interpretation of a treaty 
whenever it is directly implied in the protection of human rights in a Member State of the Inter-American system, 
even though this instrument does not come from the regional system of protection. (See Advisory Opinion 1/82 
of September 24, 1982, solicited by Peru, relating to the Advisory Function of the Court, par. 38). See also the 
works of M. VENTURA ROBLES and D. ZOVATTO, 1989; J. M. PASQUALUCCI, 2002, pp. 241-288; and P. NIKKEN, 2003, 
pp. 161-184. 
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is given by the international instrument that they interpret, that is to say, a treaty’s interpretation 
has the same value and force as that of the interpreted treaty itself.38  
 
Since 1982, the Inter-American Court has given 19 advisory opinions, of which only two were 
requested by the Mexican government: in 1999, the one relating to the right to information about 
consular assistance in the framework of the guarantees of due process and, the second, in 2002, 
relating to the legal condition of immigrants. This last consultative procedure, which will be the 
object of our study, has generated the greatest mobilization in the history of the Court.39 The 
motive was a ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States of America. 
 
In March 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court decided, in the case of Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. 
National Labor Relations Board, that an undocumented worker did not have the right to receive 
back pay after being illegally fired for attempting to exercise the rights granted to him by labor 
law, specifically by the National Labor Relations Act.40 The Supreme Court maintained that the 
prohibition on working without authorization, established by immigration law, prevailed over 
the right to form and be part of a union.41  
 
The decision in the case of Hoffman Plastic Compounds was adopted by a majority 5-4 vote. The 
author of the minority dissenting opinion was Justice S. G. Breyer, the last of the members of the 
Court nominated in the Clinton era. He showed that allowing illegal immigrants the access to the 
same legal resources that citizens have is the only way of assuring the protection of their rights. 
                                                          
38 Cfr. Advisory Opinion 18/03, cit., par. 60. In this line, see, C. DE SILVA NAVA, “La jurisprudencia, interpretación y 
creación del Derecho”, in Isonomía. Revista de Teoría y Filosofía del Derecho, no. 5 (1996), p. 22; H. FAÚNDEZ LEDESMA, 
El sistema interamericano de protección de los derechos humanos. Aspectos institucionales y procesales, Inter-American 
Institute of Human Rights, San José de Costa Rica, 1996, p. 453; C. MARTÍN, 2004, p. 266; and L. ORTIZ AHLF, 2004, 
cit., p. 47. 
 
39 The procedure counted on the participation of twelve American countries, the Inter-American Commission, the 
United Nations Agency on Refugees, the Consejo Centroamericano de Procuradores de Derechos Humanos, and 
nine entities of civil society and academia from various countries in the region. 
 
40 535 U.S. 137 (2002). This case involved José Castro, a Mexican man hired at the plant of the company Hoffman 
Plastic Compounds, located in a suburb of Los Angeles, California. In 1989, when Mr. Castro helped with the 
organization of a union to improve the working conditions at the plant, he was fired. In January 1992, the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decided that firing him was illegal and ordered back pay and the rehiring 
of Mr. Castro. In June 1993, during a hearing before an administrative judge of the NLRB to determine the total 
amount of the back pay and processing, Mr. Castro declared that he had never been legally admitted into the 
United States nor authorized to work there. Due to this testimony, the administrative judge decided that back pay 
could not be awarded to him, since it would be in conflict with the Immigration Control Reform Act of 1986. This 
law prohibits companies from knowingly hiring undocumented workers and workers from using false 
documents to be hired. In September 1998, the NLRB revoked the decision of the administrative judge and 
indicated that the most effective form of promoting immigration consisted in providing undocumented workers 
with the same guarantees and resources that labor laws give to other employees. The NLRB decided that 
although the undocumented worker did not have the right to be rehired, he was owed back pay and the 
accumulated interest for 3 years of lost work, a quantity of over $67,000. In 2001, the Federal Appeals Court 
denied the request for review presented by the company and confirmed the decision of the NLRB. 
 
41 This decision follows the line set by the case Sure-Tan v. National Labor Relations Board [467 U.S. 883 (1984)], in 
which it was established that workers can be handed over to the National Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, even when the employer’s motive for doing so is an illegal retaliation against a worker dedicated to an 
activity protected by labor law. 
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Justice Breyer carefully analyzed the possible impact of the decision on illegal workers, indicating 
that if undocumented workers cannot receive pay for back pay upon being illegally fired, 
employers will fire those workers will they attempt to unionize, as there would be no 
consequence for the employer, at least the first time they use this method.42  
 
Conservative estimates suggest that there are at least 5.3 million illegal immigrants working in 
the United States, and that 2 million of them come from Mexico. Given this fact, the Mexican 
government’s alarm was immediate – understandable if one takes into account that the money 
that Mexicans residing in the United States send to their families in Mexico is one of the largest 
sources of income for the Mexican economy. 
 
Thus, two months after the ruling in the case of Hoffman Plastic Compounds, the Mexican 
government decided to solicit an advisory opinion so that the Inter-American Court could 
address various questions that implied the interpretation of the principle of equality and the duty 
of respecting fundamental rights listed in the American Convention. The Mexican Government, 
in the formulation of its observations, does not refer explicitly to the Supreme Court, although it 
is clear that its written opinion is structured as a response to each of the points made by the 
highest American court. 
 
It is ironic that the Mexican government, pointed out that “the individual can be an active subject 
to the obligations in the matter of human rights, as well as responsible for not complying with 
them (…) since, as they are fundamental norms, and are manifestly true, and whenever there is 
no doubt as to their applicability, the individual is obliged to respect them, regardless of the 
internal measures that the state has implemented to ensure compliance with them.”43 It is ironic 
since the Mexican legal system is structured according to the idea that fundamental rights are 
limits placed exclusively on the state.44 
 
This is not the only perplexing feature of this case. In the considerations of the same text, once the 
Mexican government adopts the title of “defender of human rights for migrant workers,” it 
points out that in spite of its efforts “it has not been able to avoid the exacerbation of 
discriminatory legislation and practices against foreigners in a country other than their own, nor 
the regulation of the labor market based on discriminatory criteria, accompanied by xenophobia," 
in a clear allusion to the United States.45 The Mexican government appears to forget its southern 
region in which thousands of Central Americans, en route to the United States, continually suffer 
endless privations and humiliations at the hands of Mexican government employees, a situation 
                                                          
42 It is important to mention that the decision in the case at hand leaves the right to minimum wage and overtime 
pay intact, in accordance with the Fair Labor Standards Act, as this act only referred to back pay for work that 
was never done. 
 
43 Advisory Opinion 18/03, cit., paragraph 19. 
 
44 See with regard to this matter, J. MIJANGOS Y GONZÁLEZ, 2007, pp. 70-143. 
 
45 Ibid, paragraphs 12 and 13.  
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that has been verified, in situ, a few years ago by the Commission of the Senate of the Republic.46 
In any case, these questions are beyond the object of this research, for which reason I will now 
proceed to analyze the arguments of the Inter-American Court. 
 
The Court believes that after the considerations posed by the Mexican government it must 
address the following questions: 1) the obligation to respect and guarantee human rights and the 
fundamental character of the principle of equality and non-discrimination, 2) the application of 
this principle to migrants, 3) the rights of undocumented migrant workers and 4) the state 
obligations in the determination of immigration policies in light of international instruments for 
the protection of human rights. Our study will focus on the second and third points, which 
contain a good number of arguments that allow an affirmation of the direct effect of fundamental 
rights in private relations. 
 
The first task that the IACHR engages in is determining whether the principle of equality and 
non-discrimination can be qualified as jus cogens. In its opinion, this principle, as with the 
judgements it made previously with respect to the right to life, personal integrity or the free 
movement of people, can be considered, effectively, as an imperative of general international law, 
“to the extent that it is applicable to every state, independently of the fact that it may be a 
member or not in a particular international treaty, and has effects on third parties, including 
individuals (...) since on it rests all of the legal scaffolding of the national and international public 
order and it is the fundamental principle that permeates every legal ordinance.”47 
 
Since the previous stage, the fact that a norm was jus cogens was considered by the Court as the 
first element that allows us to claim the multidirectionality of a norm. Nevertheless, it had not 
explicitly stated the characteristics of that jus cogens. Traditionally linked to the notion of the 
public legal order, the concept of jus cogens supposes that there exist norms so fundamental to the 
international community that states may not abolish them. This concept was defined for the first 
time in an international instrument in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention of 1969 regarding the 
Law of Treaties, according to which “a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm 
                                                          
46 On August 12 and 13 of August 2004, the Commission of Human Rights of the Senate of the Republic, carried 
out a visit to the southern border of Mexico, with the purpose of verifying the situation of Central American 
migrants in the State of Chiapas. According to the report prepared by the Senate, only in the first half of 2004, 
more than 1,500 violations of fundamental rights committed by forces of Mexico were reported, among which 
stand out irregular detentions, cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment, bribery, aggravated robbery, fraud, and 
aggressions committed by various authorities. Also reported were labor violations committed by individuals, 
consisting of inhumane working hours, withholding of personal documents and salary, deception, verbal and 
physical harassment, and threats of handing the Central American migrants over to the Mexican immigration 
authorities (Gaceta Parlamentaria, September 13, 2004, no. 58, 2004). With respect to the corresponsibility of the 
Mexican state in the migration of its nationals to the United States, see the interesting study by J. A. BUSTAMANTE, 
2004. 
 
47 Advisory Opinion 18/03, cit., par. 100 and 101. In the same line of considering the principle of equality and 
non-discrimination as that of jus cogens, see the case of Yatama v. Nicaragua, Judgement of June 23, 2005, par. 184 
and 185. This case stands out as the first instance in which the IACHR directly addresses the topic of political 
rights. After the Advisory Opinion 18/03, it is possible to identify a series of resolutions in which another 
fundamental right, the prohibition of physical or psychological torture, was consolidated as a jus cogens norm. See 
also, among others, Hermanos Gómez Paquiyauri v. Perú, Judgement of July 8, 2004, par 112; and Baldeón García v. 
Perú, Judgement of April 6, 2006, par. 35. 
 18
InDret 1/2008  Javier Mijangos y González 
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from 
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character.”48 Nevertheless, jus cogens has not been 
limited to the law of the treaties. Its domain has expanded, also reaching general international 
law, and covering all acts of a legal nature. This is how the Inter-American Court understands it, 
pointing out that the true virtue of this concept today can be appreciated in the international 
responsibility of the states.  
 
Once the Court carried out the review of the most important international resolutions in this 
matter,49 it established the fact that fundamental rights listed in the Convention are jus cogens 
norms, but not only because, in the words of A. Gómez Robledo, they represent the juridical 
expression of the international community itself as a whole, but also because, in addition, the 
very Member States themselves determined it to be so upon establishing the obligation to respect 
and guarantee the human rights listed in Article 1.1 of the Convention.50 Through the union of 
these two factors, the fundamental rights established in the ACHR become an Inter-American 
Public Order, that is, peremptory norms of the Inter-American system. 
 
Various consequences with specific obligations result from the characterization of fundamental 
rights as jus cogens norms and the general obligation for their respect. The Court determined 
what these obligations were through examining the matter of the Advisory Opinion: the rights of 
undocumented migrant workers. 
 
In the framework of a labor relationship in which the state is the employer, the state must respect 
human rights. But this obligation imposed on the state does not only operate when it is an 
employer. It also operates when, acting as a legislator, it regulates the relations between private 
individuals in the work relationship. However, the state’s obligations go beyond this, since, in the 
words of the Court, the state shall be responsible when a violation of fundamental rights is 
committed and “supported by a state directive or policy that favors the creation or maintenance 
of discriminatory situations” in the work field.51 Thus, the obligation of respect contained in 
Article 1.1 is defined in three aspects of the state’s authority: first, as a direct responsibility in its 
                                                          
48 Article 64 of the same Convention refers to jus cogens when pointing out that “if a new peremptory norm of 
general international law arises, all existing treaties that oppose this norm become null and void.” Among the 
essential works on this topic are A. VERDROSS, 1966, pp. 55-63; E. SUY, 1967, pp. 17-77; A. GÓMEZ ROBLEDO, 1981, pp. 
9-217. Similarly, see the works of R. ST. J. MACDONALD, 1987, pp. 115-149; G. A. CHRISTENSON, 1988, pp. 585-628; 
and G. M. DANILENKO, 1991, pp. 42-65. 
 
49 See the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Reservations to the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of May 28, 1951, ICJ Reports 1951, p. 15; the case of 
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited (Bélgica v. España), ICJ Reports 1970, p. 3; the case of Aplicación 
de la Convención para la prevención y la sanción del delito de genocidio (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) (preliminary 
objections) ICJ Reports 1996, p. 595; and the case Prosecutor v. Anto Furndzija, IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement of 
December 10, 1998 of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, paragraphs 137-146 y 153-
157. 
 
50 Cfr. Advisory Opinion 18/03, cit., par 102 and ss. The quote by A. GÓMEZ ROBLEDO, 1982, pp. 20-21, which 
comes from his work. 
 
51 Cfr. Advisory Opinion 18/03, cit., par. 147, 152 and 170. 
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capacity as an employer; second, as an obligation of making its internal law comply with the 
provisions of the Convention, and third, as a subsidiary responsibility when, through public 
policies, it promotes actions and practices of third parties that constitute violations of 
fundamental rights.52 
 
Now, in a work relationship made up of private individuals, the IACHR establishes that, being a 
principle of equality, like the rest of the rights of the ACHR, a jus cogens norm gives rise to erga 
omnes obligations, which the Court characterizes as a norm of necessarily objective character and, 
as a result, one that includes all of the possible receivers, members of the organs of state power as 
well as private individuals.53 For the Court, the effects of fundamental rights with respect to third 
parties are clearly configured in the legal system itself of the American Convention, specifically 
in Article 1.1, which requires the adherence to the Convention of both the state and private 
individuals. 
 
Advisory Opinion 18/03, according to the IACHR, is inscribed in “the doctrine called 
Drittwirkung, which is found in a good part of international case law."54 Thus, for the IACHR, 
Advisory Opinion 18/03 has significant implications with respect to the Inter-American system, 
implications very similar to those that Young, James and Webster v. The United Kingdom (1981)55, or 
X and Y v. Netherlands (1985)56, had on the framework of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. In the last of these cases, the European Court ruled that even when the object of Article 8 
of the Convention (right to the respect for family life) is essentially the protection of the 
individual against arbitrary interferences by public authorities, inherent positive obligations exist 
for the effective respect of private and family life, that can imply the “adoption of measures to 
ensure the respect for private life, even in relations between private individuals.” A certain sector 
of the doctrine has wanted to see in these two sentences a good demonstration that, in the 
framework of the European Convention, the Drittwirkung is mediated, since the European Court 
cannot directly apply a norm of the Convention to resolve a conflict between two private 
individuals, but rather at most condemn a state for not providing sufficiently effective protection 
against other private individuals.57  
 
                                                          
52 See also the case Masacre de Pueblo Bello v. Colombia, Judgement of January 31, 2006, par. 126 and 151. This last 
aspect, which has no precedent in the previous case law of the IACHR and which, curiously has its origin in 
various resolutions of the Supreme Court of the United States, in which the intervention of the state is interpreted 
as a form of official support that virtually promotes private discrimination – see Reitman v. Mulkey [387 U.S. 369 
(1967)], is a clear reproach of U.S. immigration policy. It is important to remember that in the case of Hoffman 
Plastic Compounds, origin of the request of the Advisory Opinion, what was basically concluded was that 
immigration policy must prevail over labor law. 
 
53 Cfr. Advisory Opinion 18/03, cit., par 140 and ss. 
 
54 Ibid, par. 140 y 143. 
 
55 Judgement of the European Court of Human Rights of August 13, 1981, series A, no. 44, paragraphs 48-65. 
 
56 Judgement of the European Court of Human Rights of March 26, 1985, series A, no. 91, paragraph 23. 
 
57 In this way, F. RIGAUX, 1990, pp. 683-685. 
 20
InDret 1/2008  Javier Mijangos y González 
We believe that this opinion is not entirely correct since, as with the Inter-American system, it is 
true that only states can be condemned for a violation of the rights listed in the Agreement, and 
in this sense we could in fact talk about mediated effect; nevertheless, from a material point of 
view, the effect is unmediated since what the state's responsibility addresses is the prior violation 
of an individuals’s right by another individual.58 
 
In any case, the consequences of the Advisory Opinion 18/03 go beyond the obligation of the 
state to have the resources necessary for the prevention or correction of violations of rights in 
private relations.59 The Inter-American Court categorically declares and without any type of 
hesitation, as it has done since the second stage of its case law, that “fundamental rights are direct 
limits on the actions of individuals.”60  
 
This statement is reiterated in the most recent case law of the IACHR. In the cases El Nacional, Así 
es la Noticia y Globovisión v. Venezuela, which are about the harassment that the independent 
media has suffered in the last few years in Venezuela at the hands of sympathizers of the 
Bolivarian Revolution, the Court has not focused its arguments on the tolerance and acquiescence 
of the regime commanded by Hugo Chávez with respect to the activities of these groups. Its 
efforts are directed at determining that the freedom of expression, as a peremptory norm of the 
Inter-American system, is a direct limit that is imposed in relation to the actions of third parties, 
and in this sense must be understood and applied by the judicial organs of the Member States.61 
 
The doctrine established in Advisory Opinion 18/03 has already been accepted into the most 
recent case law of some national courts, as in the case of Mexico. The issue Alianza por Nayarit, 
resolved by the Electoral Court of Judicial Power of the Federation in September 2005, is a clear 
example of this.62 On July 3, 2005, the elections in the Mexican state of Nayarit took place to 
choose, among other positions, the Governor of the State. This election launched the victory of 
                                                          
58 In this way, see, J. M. BILBAO UBILLOS, 1997, p. 340. 
 
59 The case Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala, Judgement of November 25, 2003, par. 153; Hermanos Gómez 
Paquiyauri v. Peru, Judgement of July 8, 2004, par. 129; and Institute de Reeducación del Menor v. Paraguay, 
Judgement of September 2, 2004. 
 
60 Advisory Opinion 18/03, cit., par. 151. 
 
61 Diarios El Nacional y Así es la Noticia v. Venezuela, Judgement of July 6, 2004, part 12; Emisora de Televisión 
Globovisión v. Venezuela, Judgement of September 2004, part 11; Carlos Nieto v. Venezuela, Judgement of July 9, 
2004, part 9; Carpio Nicolle v. Guatemala, Judgement of July 8, 2004; Gutiérrez Soler v. Colombia, Judgement of March 
11, 2005, par. 7; and Los niños adolescentes privados de libertad en el “Complexo do Tuatuapé” v. the Federal Republic of 
Brazil, Judgement of November 30, 2005. 
 
62 Judgement of September 14, 2005, given by the Superior Chamber of the Electoral Tribunal of the Judicial 
Branch of the Federation. In accordance with Article 99 of the Mexican Constitution, the Electoral Tribunal is the 
highest jurisdictional authority in this matter, with the exception of that provided for in section II of Article 105 of 
the Constitution itself. This precept gives the Electoral Tribunal the power to resolve cases regarding the 
contestation of federal, state, and municipal elections; the violation of politico-electoral rights of the citizens, the 
resolution of labor conflicts between servants of the Federal Electoral Institute and its workers, as well as those 
aroused by the servants of the tribunal itself. Similarly, the precept provides that the Superior Chamber will carry 
out the final count of the results for the Presidential Election of the United Mexican States, once the contestation is 
resolved, and that it will formulate a declaration of validity of the election and the President elect. 
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the Institutional Revolutionary Party by a slim margin of votes over the electoral coalition called 
Alianza por Nayarit. This coalition brought about a trial of nonconformity before the Electoral 
Tribunal, against the count and the declaration of the validity of the election. Among the offenses 
cited, one that stands out is that of the supposed lack of equity in the private media of the entity 
that, according to the Alianza por Nayarit, blatantly favored the PRI in terms of airtime and 
content.  
 
It is important to mention here that in the first phase of the trial for the constitutional electoral 
revision, the Chamber of the Electoral Court of the State of Nayarit determined that the offenses 
of the electoral commission were unfounded, since the media “is free to select which piece of 
news or information they wish to give greater time or relevance to, in virtue of the fact that they 
are engaged in a commercial activity which, as such, has the objective of offering the public a 
permanent and more efficient communication service, and the one that brings them a greater 
economic benefit.”63 By the judgement of the Superior Chamber of the Electoral Tribunal, the 
argumentation of the regional chamber lacked substance, since “the existence of an evident, 
explicit and clear treatment that is systematically innocuous or discriminatory by the private 
media toward the political parties can come to constitute violations of its obligation of respect for third 
party rights."64 
 
This obligation of respect for fundamental rights on the part of private individuals, by the 
judgment of the Electoral Tribunal comes from two sources. In the first place, from that provided 
for by the ACHR and the case law of the Inter-American Court, which “has extended the duty of 
respect for rights to the administrative, legislative and judicial authorities, as well as other 
normative subjects like entities of public interest, whatever its nature or formal origin may be, as 
are electronic media and mass communication65” and, in second place, from the normative 
supremacy of the constitutional provisions, which imply “a principle of linkage, subjection and 
obligatoryness in first order for the trustees of public power of the state and, in general, for every 
individual or judicial person, be he official, social or private.”66 
 
The arguments established in the case Alianza por Nayarit has been reiterated by the Electoral 
Court in the case State of Mexico67, in the case Coahuila68, and in the Dictamen relativo al cómputo 
                                                          
63 Similarly, the regional chamber of the Electoral Tribunal determined that the media in Mexico enjoy the 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression, and is not subject to any limitation other than the right to 
private life, moral and public peace, for the content of information published by the media in the country is its 
sole responsibility. The media is therefore in full liberty of choosing who or what they will give greatest attention. 
(Cfr. Judgement of August 19, 2005, by the Second Chamber of the Electoral Tribunal of the State of Nayarit) 
 
64 Judgement of September 14, 2005, cit., p. 45. 
 
65 Ibid, p. 55. 
 
66 Judgement of September 14, 2005, p. 54. 
 
67 Judgement of September 14, 2005, by the Superior Chamber of the Electoral Tribunal of Judicial Power of the 
Federation, pp. 400-407. 
 
68 Judgement of November 23, 2005, by the Superior Chamber of the Electoral Tribunal of Judicial Power of the 
Federation, pp. 157-160. 
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final de la elección de Presidente de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, declaración de validez de la elección y 
de presidente electo69.  
                                                          
 
These resolutions are not only a demonstration that the debate over the applicability of 
fundamental rights in private relations has acquired greater complexity in the Mexican legal 
system after the case law of the IACHR in this matter. It is urgent that the courts and 
constitutional tribunals of Latin American countries end the traditional and unjustified rejection 
of the Inter-American Court in their internal ordinances. Its case law has come to have new 
content and meaning for fundamental rights in Latin America. Ignoring and rejecting its 
resolutions cannot but intensify the chronic deficit of judicial protection that the inhabitants of 
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